

Enclosure 1

(U) Background and Executive Summary of Events:

1. (U) From 2015 to 2020, I served as a Deputy National Intelligence Officer (DNIO) at the National Intelligence Council (NIC). For the first four years, I served as DNIO-Cyber and IC Lead for East Asian Cyber Issues. A secondary area of my focus was Cyber-enabled information operations, assigned to me by the first National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Cyber, [REDACTED]. This role was based on my prior experience in the subject and my having [REDACTED].
2. [REDACTED] I led the production of the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on Cyber threats to the 2016 US Presidential Election- ICA-2016-37.<sup>i</sup> This ICA (2016 ICA) was specifically tasked by then-Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper during a secure video-conference call conducted with the NIO Cyber – [REDACTED] - myself, and others. On the call, the DNI stated that then-President of the United States (POTUS) Obama had urgently requested a comprehensive analysis on election security, and the DNI accepted [REDACTED] proposal to deliver the analysis via the ICA format. I completed and delivered the 2016 ICA prior to the November 2016 polls, and was commended for these efforts in my annual performance review by [REDACTED] and then Vice-Chair (VC) of the NIC, [REDACTED] [Attachment 1].<sup>ii</sup> After the November 2016 polls I participated in production of multiple intelligence products, including Presidential Daily Briefings (PDB) assessing if, how, and why Russia might have interfered in the 2016 election. The outgoing Obama administration then tasked a new ICA (2017 ICA) on the election.
3. [REDACTED] For the new 2017 ICA, I was directed by [REDACTED] to focus on Russian attempts to access US election-related infrastructure. IC reporting suggested many Russia-attributed IP addresses were making connection attempts that the IC could not explain the purpose of. Later, when presenting [REDACTED] with our findings, [REDACTED] directed us to abandon any further study of the subject, saying “it’s something else.” In light of later development in open source reporting, I came to have concerns about this Russia-attributed cyber activity and the abrupt dismissal of the study effort.
4. (U) In addition, I noted other nations’ efforts to influence the 2016 Presidential election, but this critical context was omitted from the 2017 ICA. During conversion of the 2017 ICA to TS//SCI and UNCLASSIFIED versions, key context was not included, and I was pressured to alter my views on the 2017 ICA’s Key Judgements, with the expressed intent by [REDACTED] that my concurrence was sought to enable [REDACTED] to sway the views of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

[REDACTED]

5. (U// [REDACTED]) In 2019, as a member of the NIC’s classified “ELECTION\_INFLUENCE,” email distro [REDACTED] I received an email related to FOIA request DF-2019-00269 that included commentary from NIC staff suggesting “Steele Dossier” information was a factor in the 2017 ICA. Because this suggested a possibility that NIC staff, including [REDACTED], had misled other NIC staff, including myself, for several years, I reached out to NIC leadership, specifically [REDACTED], the then-NIC VC. [REDACTED] response was dismissive and [REDACTED] suggested that *“it is routine that we get material and don’t share it with everyone—and it’s not a matter of a particular clearance”* (see attachment 2). Considering that I was part of the NIC’s Election Influence Team, this seemed inexplicable- especially since [REDACTED] stated it was not a matter of clearance. Shortly thereafter, I was removed from the email distro without warning or explanation. I then contacted the IC Inspector General (IC IG) with concerns. In parallel, open source information led me to believe events that I had knowledge or records of might be relevant to ongoing federal criminal investigations. Throughout 2020, 2021, and 2022, I urged the IC IG to convey the “fact of” my concerns and records to appropriate parties, culminating in an IC IG representative verbal statement to me, in 2022, that it would be up to me to initiate contact with DOJ in my personal capacity. I then contacted a DOJ representative, but have yet to receive the follow-up engagement that the DOJ representative stated, in 2022, would occur.

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<sup>1</sup> (U) ICA 2016-37HC, (U) Cyber Threats to the 2016 US Presidential Election, document is classified [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//

Recollections of Statements made by

- (U) [REDACTED] statements to me in early January 2017, regarding the 2017 ICA were:
- (U) [REDACTED]: There is reporting you are not allowed to see, if you saw it, you would agree.
  - (U) My response was that I concurred with varying confidence with most of the 2017 ICA's Key Judgements, but I would need to review any reporting myself in order to consider it.
- (U) [REDACTED]: Isn't it possible Putin has something on Trump, to blackmail and coerce him?
  - (U//FOUO) After some debate, I declined to alter my own analysis based on this suggestion. To provide context of my response, weeks earlier [REDACTED] had back briefed several of us on a meeting [REDACTED] claimed to have just come from with the DNI, following the DNI's return from his first meeting with POTUS-elect Trump, at which the DNI was accompanied by CIA Director John Brennan and FBI Director James Comey. According to [REDACTED], the DNI had been surprised by DIR Comey's unilateral, last-moment inclusion of the "Steele Dossier" in briefing materials – supposedly inserted by DIR Comey as the group rode together in a government vehicle. [REDACTED] had characterized the "Steel Dossier" as being viewed by the DNI, and [REDACTED] as well, as non-credible sensationalism, and to my knowledge the material had never been taken seriously by the IC. I thus asked [REDACTED] if the IC now judged "Steele Dossier" allegations, or something like them, to be credible. [REDACTED] response was noncommittal and evasive. [REDACTED] implied incriminating compartmented reporting "might" exist, but I suspected [REDACTED] was echoing a public narrative (that the IC ostensibly viewed as false) as a way for me to justify logical contortions needed to arrive at the analytic judgement [REDACTED] desired me to reach.
- (U) [REDACTED]: You need to TRUST ME on this.
  - (U) [REDACTED] further reiterated [REDACTED] ongoing invocation that I abandon my tradecraft standards. [REDACTED] had told me on prior occasions that [REDACTED] viewed my analyst culture and tradecraft as a pseudo-religion [REDACTED] did not share, and had stated I would need to demonstrate my ability to "outgrow" it in order for [REDACTED] to recommend my promotion to a Senior Executive Service (SES) position. I held firm and explained that the 'religion' of analysts, as [REDACTED] called it, to which I belonged, meant I could not claim to concur with analysis that I did not believe in. I explained that I would defer to [REDACTED], as NIO, on the NIO Cyber analytic line. But I would not say that I agreed with an analysis that I contested.
- (U) [REDACTED] (now visibly frustrated, stated): "[REDACTED] I need you to say you agree with these judgements, so that DIA will go along with them!"
  - (U) Discussion between us ensued on DIA's supposed trust in me, and the necessity of me proving my "corporate IC officer" bona-fides by doing what it took to bring DIA on board as an additional IC Agency signing on to the 2017 ICA. I declined to do so, citing my adherence to DOD Analytic objectivity standards, and remembered aloud to [REDACTED] how, [REDACTED], they "used to give us a little card to wear on our lanyards" reminding us to remain analytically objective.
- (U) I remember this conversation very clearly, as it was a difficult situation and I listened, and chose my responses, with care. I was aware that I was defying the NIO's direction to me (to misrepresent my views to DIA) based on a conscious decision to adhere to IC standards, tradecraft, and ethics.

*This statement is made to best of my recollection.*

[REDACTED] 31 March 2023

UNCLASSIFIED//

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Saturday, July 19, 2025 11:34 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@odni.gov>  
**Cc:** [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@odni.gov>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@spaceforce.mil>  
**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Fw: Intelligence Oversight, SAF/IG statement that "Our office is not informing Congressional Committees..."

FYSA re USSF & Congress. [REDACTED] [copied] can provide referenced oversight report via JWICS.

[REDACTED]

----- Forwarded Message -----

**From:** [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@spaceforce.mil>  
**To:** Civil Liberties <cl@dodig.mil>  
**Cc:** [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Sunday, July 9, 2023 at 02:37:47 PM PDT  
**Subject:** RE: Intelligence Oversight, SAF/IG statement that "Our office is not informing Congressional Committees..."

[REDACTED],

I contacted you because part of my concern involves activities by the USIC, to include DOD officers, that may constitute abuse of USG authorities as a means to violate the civil liberties of US persons. Admittedly this is only a small subset of my concerns, but as I was advised by SAF IG to reach out to DOD IG, I thought you would want to be included.

Moreover ... as you are one of the only discoverable direct emails to anyone on the DOD IG team, please be advised that the 'hotline' number does not appear to actually be staffed by anyone who can pick up in a timely {sub 90min on hold} time period, making it a de-facto non-hotline.

I would think that this, in and of itself, would be of concern to both DOD IG staff, and oversight bodies, but it is by no means the reason I am reaching out.

Finally, if you have an alternate email address, from which I might receive as prompt a response as you gave me { which IS appreciated } Please advise.

[REDACTED]

**From:** Civil Liberties <[CI@dodig.mil](mailto:CI@dodig.mil)>

**Sent:** Thursday, July 6, 2023 6:31 AM

**To:** [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@spaceforce.mil>

**Subject:** RE: Intelligence Oversight, SAF/IG statement that "Our office is not informing Congressional Committees..."

[REDACTED]

Thank you for contacting the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General FOIA, Privacy and Civil Liberties Office. Based on the information in the emails below, I believe you are attempting to contact the DoD Hotline. The Hotline can be reached at 800-424-9098, or <https://www.dodig.mil/Components/Administrative-Investigations/DoD-Hotline/Classified-Complaint/>.

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

FOIA Public Liaison  
FOIA, Privacy and Civil Liberties Office  
Office of Inspector General  
Department of Defense

Phone: [REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@spaceforce.mil>

**Sent:** Tuesday, June 27, 2023 10:41 AM

**To:** SAF/IG Hotline <[SAF.IGHOTLINE@us.af.mil](mailto:SAF.IGHOTLINE@us.af.mil)>

**Cc:** [REDACTED]; [Judiciary\\_Whistleblower@mail.house.gov](mailto:Judiciary_Whistleblower@mail.house.gov); Civil Liberties <[CI@dodig.mil](mailto:CI@dodig.mil)>; [REDACTED], OIG DoD <[REDACTED]>; [info@osc.gov](mailto:info@osc.gov)

**Subject:** RE: Intelligence Oversight, SAF/IG statement that "Our office is not informing

Congressional Committees..."

SAF IG,

Thank you for your written declaration of 26 June 2023, copied verbatim below, that you are willfully and intentionally "not informing Congress" of Intelligence oversight issues raised by USG employees through the official channels, and your suggestion of some of my options to proceed. I would ask that you retain my submitted information, and all records of your deliberations regarding it, as I suspect some Congressional offices will request it in days to come.

DOD IG,

Please advise means by which I can convey concerns and documents regarding malfeasance, possible criminal activities, and events which call into question the integrity of the US Intelligence Community, including attempts by IC Officers to bias public and internal perceptions of USPERSONS, as well as potential negligence during DOJ investigations, and to which I must now add my concern that DOD intelligence oversight processes may be breaking down.

Respectfully,



PS – Congressional staff, if you wish, please feel free to convey this email to the staff of Senator Warner, who is my representative, but whose office has refused to provide me an email address when I called requesting one.

-----Original Message-----

From: SAF/IG Hotline <[SAF.IGHOTLINE@us.af.mil](mailto:SAF.IGHOTLINE@us.af.mil)>

Sent: Monday, June 26, 2023 4:59 PM

To:  <@spaceforce.mil>

Subject: RE: Intelligence Oversight reporting and conveyance concerns

Greetings,

Thank you for the opportunity to clarify our assistance.

**Our office is not informing Congressional Committees of your concerns and we encourage you to contact your Member of Congress and DoDIG. We cannot provide your issues to DoDIG on your behalf.**

If you have any questions or concerns, please reply to this email address as this is the appropriate office to assist you.

Respectfully,  
SAF/IGQ

SAF Inspector General Hotline  
Complaints Resolution Directorate

SAF/IGQ  
1140 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1140

Note: This mailbox is only monitored and operated during normal business hours Monday through Friday. Any records or documents provided to the IG become part of an IG record and are not returnable unless you complete a FOIA request.

From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@spaceforce.mil>  
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2023 12:20 PM  
To: SAF/IG Hotline <SAF.IGHOTLINE@us.af.mil>  
Cc: [Judiciary\\_Whistleblower@mail.house.gov](mailto:Judiciary_Whistleblower@mail.house.gov); [REDACTED]  
Subject: Intelligence Oversight reporting and conveyance concerns

Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General,

[CC to oversight representatives as email addresses become available, BCC +]

On 12 January 2023, in accordance with DODD 5148.13, working through my designated Intelligence Oversight chain here within United States Space Force (where I currently serve on a Joint Duty assignment, on detail from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence), I reported potential Sensitive/Highly Sensitive Matters (S/HSM) regarding prior Intelligence Community (IC) activities, to include potential significant malfeasance by at least one DOD Intelligence Officer serving on the National Intelligence Council (NIC), potential malfeasance by NON-DOD intelligence officers serving on the NIC and in other parts of the USG, and potential attempts to use both the outreach of commercial law-firms to the IC, and the possible manipulation of US cyber infrastructure, as means to distort and bias IC analysis, and threaten the integrity of US Presidential Election processes. I also reported my concerns over potential obstruction of my reporting, process insufficiency, and possible, though by no means certain, negligence or obstruction by staff supporting Attorney General Durham.

This DODD 5148.13 reporting was formalized in my Memorandum for Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Oversight, Director of Oversight and Compliance, Subject: "Reporting Intelligence Oversight Concerns" of 31 March 2023. As attachments to this Memorandum, I provided extensive written documentation, including unclassified and classified records substantiating my concern, and stood ready – as I have since 2019 – to provide additional details.

On June 16, 2023 [see below] you [SAF/IG] responded to me via unclassified email with a cursory redirect to the DOD IG hotline – via a website that suggests that the DOD IG's focus is NOT on Intelligence Oversight, and that also encourages me to contact my Service IG – in this case, you, SAF/IG.

As DODD 5148.13 makes clear that:

- "Appropriate senior leaders and policymakers within the Executive Branch and congressional defense and intelligence committees must be notified of events that may erode public trust in the conduct of DoD intelligence activities."

- And that "activity or conduct that qualifies as either a QIA or S/HSM is reportable under Section 4 without waiting for substantiation, completion of an investigation, formal adjudication, or final resolution

of the issue"

And,

- as you have not responded to my 16 June question [below] about whether you have conveyed my DODD 5148.13 submission to the congressional defense and intelligence committees, or to the DOD IG, and;

- as I myself have attempted to contact the DOD IG, but waited for well over 1.5 hours on hold to the DOD IG hotline today without answer, and;

- as staff representing the overall IC IG previously advised me that they LACKED any process to convey my concerns or information- but also asserted that I had the option to proceed with conveyance in my 'personal' capacity, outside Executive Branch channels, and;

- as Congressional committees are currently investigating directly related matters, which my submission may have bearing upon;

I am therefore requesting that you promptly notify congressional defense and intelligence committees of, and provide them access to, my Memorandum of 31 March 2023 and all the attachments to it. If the DOD IG is the preferred path within the executive branch for this notification and submission, please proactively enable me to work with them to facilitate submission in a timely and complete manner via traditional Executive branch channels.

Respectfully,

[REDACTED]

ODNI Cadre on JDA to USSF [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, June 16, 2023 4:44 PM  
To: SAF/IG Hotline <<mailto:SAF.IGHOTLINE@US.AF.MIL>>  
Cc: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@spaceforce.mil>  
Subject: RE: SAF/IGQ assistance

SAF IG,

Please advise me in writing if you have informed Congressional Committees regarding my submission, have not but plan to, or, are deferring to the DOD IG.

If the latter [defer], are you or have you conveyed any of the materials I provided to you?

Thank you,

[REDACTED]

From: SAF/IG Hotline <<mailto:SAF.IGHOTLINE@us.af.mil>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 15, 2023 1:54 PM  
To: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@spaceforce.mil>  
Subject: SAF/IGQ assistance

Greetings,

The SAF/IGQ was contacted to assist you with your security concerns. We reviewed your issues and determined the appropriate resolution path is with the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG). The DoDIG is independent from the IC. The DoDIG has resolution authority over all DoD components and DoD combat support agencies.

Please contact DoD IG at: <http://www.dodig.mil/> and/or 1-800-424-9098.

We hope this information is helpful.

This email is the appropriate method to respond to the SAF/IG if you have any questions.

Respectfully,  
SAF/IGQ

SAF Inspector General Hotline  
Complaints Resolution Directorate  
SAF/IGQ  
1140 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1140

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## Enclosure 2

### (U) Detailed Narrative of Issues and Events

(U) Between 2016 and 2022, through first-hand involvement, I became aware of multiple events that may have represented the use or attempted use of national security authorities to influence domestic politics. I believe some of these events may have influenced or been intended to influence Congressional and public perceptions of the 2016 Presidential Election, and I am concerned others may represent attempts to obstruct lawful oversight.

1. (U) Issue 1. Unsolicited contact by a DC Law Firm and anomalous inquiry about IC officers briefing Congress on election hacking. In 2016, I participated in anomalous contact between the IC and the Washington D.C. law firm Squire Patten Boggs. I initially viewed this as an attempt to raise the profile of a cyber-expert the law firm represented. In retrospect, I have concern the engagement may have been an attempt to direct IC focus and analysis in order to shape congressional and public views regarding interference in the 2016 election.

- a. (U) In late February of 2016, the NIO Cyber (then [REDACTED]) referred me to NIC “Counselor,” [REDACTED], who had been contacted by the Washington D.C. law firm Squire Patten Boggs (SPB). [REDACTED] stated that SPB had made contact with the NIC via the NIC Strategic Futures Group (SFG) Director [REDACTED], and that SPB sought to share concerns regarding the cybersecurity of US elections. As cyber threats to elections worldwide were an area of focus for the NIO Cyber team, I was directed by [REDACTED] to engage with SPB. I called and then received an email response from SPB on 2 March 2016. [Attachment 3] In the email, SPB’s Senior Policy Advisor, [REDACTED], stated that SPB represented [REDACTED], who was described by [REDACTED] as “Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid’s appointee to the Board of Advisors for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) [and] the Board Chair of Verified Voting” who sought to “provide [the IC]...a brief update on new developments concerning cybersecurity issues regarding voting.”<sup>i</sup> I explained we could meet [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] capacity as a Voting Expert but not as a Legislative branch representative. I met with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] on 9 March 2016 at SPB (at 2550 M Street, NW). At that meeting, no significant “new developments regarding cybersecurity” were raised, but, [REDACTED] repeatedly inquired if there were any NIO (or in my case, any DNIO) willing to testify to Congress on cyber threats to U.S. elections. I asked [REDACTED] if hearings on the subject were planned, to which [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] believed there might be hearings scheduled in days to come. I made clear that contact between a DNIO or NIO, and the legislative branch, would need to go through ODNI’s legislative affairs branch, but stated potentially, yes we could brief Congress.<sup>ii</sup> [REDACTED] later sent me two unclassified, non-substantial documents addressing “Unsolved Risks of Internet Voting” - ostensibly not a common practice within the US at the time - and another titled “Cybersecurity Concerns

[REDACTED]

Regarding Voting in the 2016 Elections” which did not, in my view, reflect a focus on current threats.<sup>iii</sup> [REDACTED] later served as an expert at the NIC Cyber Threats to E-Democracy conference.<sup>iv</sup>

**2. (U) Issue 2. Pressure to misrepresent analytic judgements regarding the 2016 Presidential election in the context of the 2017 ICA.** I expressed tradecraft concerns and analytic disagreement with [REDACTED] over a key judgement in the TS//SCI and unclassified versions of the 2017 ICA- namely, I objected to overall framing of Russian activities as “efforts to influence,” as opposed to discredit the outcome of, the 2016 election, and also judged that the 2017 ICA’s treatment of overt media activities was omitting important context. In response, [REDACTED] actively pressured me to change my judgements, and stated clearly and directly to me that [REDACTED] sought my concurrence as a means to persuade the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), so that DIA would provide their concurrence with the analytic assessments of the 2017 ICA.

- a. (U) In the run-up to, and following, the 2016 Presidential Election, I participated in NIC analysis of election associated cybersecurity issues, coordination of PDBs describing the security of the election, and the crafting of content that was planned to be used in the 2017 ICA [I believe this ICA took the form of three related products: an ICA protected within Compartment Access Program (CAP) channels, a Top Secret (TS) // Sensitive Compartment Information (SCI) ICA (number 2017-01D of 6 January 2017), and an unclassified version of the ICA.] Several aspects of the 2017 ICA’s drafting were unusual. First, other than [REDACTED], the “team” crafting the post-election ICA did not engage with me despite my role as lead for the IC’s coordinated assessment of the topic in the 2016 ICA only a few months prior. Instead, [REDACTED] directed me to focus on a specific issue (described in the following text as *Sub Issue 1*) that would be treated as a “module” and incorporated into the 2017 ICA. That analysis was never fully incorporated, and, I later came to view some of the reporting it relied upon as a possible indication of criminal activity by USPERSONs under investigation. I also performed analysis of the broader information environment (described in the following text as *Sub Issue 2*), identifying election-related activities conducted by media based within various US allies, but I was discouraged from analyzing this activity further, and the context it provided was not incorporated into the 2017 ICA. When the 2017 ICA was completed, it was protected within CAP channels and I was never shown it in full. [REDACTED] then called a fellow DNIO Cyber ([REDACTED]) and I into [REDACTED] office to help [REDACTED] craft the TS//SCI and unclassified versions of the 2017 ICA. I concurred with the 2017 ICA’s judgement that Moscow sought to “undermine public faith in the US democratic process” and I had been on record expressing this view in classified, unclassified, and even openly published documents since 2015.<sup>v</sup> In my own judgement, it was also likely that Moscow sought to *influence how Americans viewed the process and results of the 2016 election*, but I did not assess at that time that this indicated Russian goals were, as the opening sentence of the 2017 ICA states, “to *influence the 2016 US Presidential election*” itself.

[REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED] Through my role in leading production of the prior 2016 ICA, I also knew that as recently as September of 2016, other elements of the IC<sup>vi</sup> had pushed back during analytic coordination on warnings of Russian intent to influence the 2016 presidential election, stating that such a judgement would be misleading. Yet, by January, at least one of the IC Elements that had pushed back (the Federal Bureau of Investigation) had seemingly altered its position and embraced a judgement of Russian intent to influence the election, seemingly without any new data other than the election's unexpected result and public speculation that Russia had "hacked" the vote – a scenario that, we in the IC judged, simply did not occur.<sup>vii viii ix</sup> As for the 2017 ICA's judgement of a decisive Russian preference for then-candidate Donald Trump, I could not concur in good conscience based on information available, and my professional analytic judgement. I did not rule the possibility out, and was willing to be convinced, but I was not offered access to any of the supposedly dispositive reporting when I asked to review it (as a DNIO at the NIC, a "one time" read in for almost anything relevant was normally provided).

(1) (U) [REDACTED] then made arguments in which [REDACTED] pressured me to accept the 2017 ICA's judgement of a decisive Russian preference for then President-elect Trump, and stated to me that he sought my concurrence as means to sway the position of DIA. [see Attachment 4]

(2) [REDACTED] **Sub-Issue 1. Direction to cease analysis of suspicious connections.** After being directed to conduct analysis of Russian-attributed cyber activity for the 2017 ICA, I had been abruptly directed to abandon further investigation, and was told by [REDACTED] that reported activity was "something else." Based on open source information developed from the Durham investigation,<sup>x,xi</sup> I came to view some of the reported cyber activity as possibly related to activities of USPERSONs under federal investigation.

a) [REDACTED] I was tasked by [REDACTED] to partner with a DHS analyst assigned to the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) to conduct an overview analysis of Russia-attributed cyber connections to U.S. cyber infrastructures associated with elections. I was told that this analysis would be used as a module in the 2017 ICA. The reporting suggested that prior to the election, Russian cyber actors were seeking and in some cases gaining access to election-associated cyber infrastructure in the US. Some of this reporting was driven by detection of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that fell within the IP ranges historically used by Russian state cyber actors, connecting to U.S. election-related networks, and this aligned with some of the threat scenarios we had assessed in months prior. As the IC provided the U.S. State-level governments more information on suspicious IP ranges, more connection attempts from suspicious IP ranges were reported. While there was at least one case of

[REDACTED]

exfiltration of Personally Identifying Information (PII) from a victim system, in many reports, it seemed only brief interaction was occurring – in some cases, no unauthorized access, or even attempted access, was detected on “victim” systems. In no case, in 2016, did we judge any observed malign or unexpected cyber activity was capable of altering any U.S. votes, but, the enigmatic<sup>xiii</sup> cyber activity raised concerns. Presuming the activity was correctly attributed to Russian actors, either Moscow was gaining accesses we could not detect; or, was making contact for its own sake - likely, I assessed, as a basis for subsequent [REDACTED]. During December, the DHS analyst and I continued to press for information on possible undetected compromises or exploitation; we produced a graphic showing the reports and findings; a subset of the activity featured in a PDB; FBI generated products on the connections; and some of the events were alluded to within the 2017 ICA. However, before the 2017 ICA was finalized [REDACTED] directed me to abandon analysis of these events, stating reports of Russia-attributed cyber activity were “something else.” At the time, I considered abandonment of the effort to be odd, given its basis in reporting of relatively low classification and [REDACTED] stated goal of making the 2017 ICA comprehensive, but at the time I did not view the omission as nefarious. However, I later also began to consider it possible that some of the reporting might reflect Domain Name Service (DNS) record manipulation by parties other than Russia, possibly USPERSONs, relevant to the Durham investigation, and conveyed this to my contact there. (See Enclosure 3, Possible DNS manipulation.)

(3) (U) **Sub-Issue 2: Failure to provide diverse perspectives or formulate a comprehensive and holistic assessment of foreign influence activities on the 2016 presidential election, in violation of tradecraft standards.** Analysis of countries other-than Russia that I judged to be seeking to influence US elections, both for and against then-candidate Hillary Clinton and against then-candidate Donald Trump, and tradecraft recommendations to address this issue were disregarded resulting in an incomplete analysis and a treatment of Russian media activities that failed to incorporate the reported global context.

- a) (U/[REDACTED]) As various intelligence products on Russian interference were written, a body of open, English language Russian media articles denigrating then-candidate Clinton were assembled by the NIC. I was told this would be used in the unclassified versions of the 2017 ICA as a means to substantiate judgements regarding Russian intent. I did not contest the fact of abundant Russian media denigration of then-candidate Clinton, but I was also aware of the denigration of *multiple* US presidential candidates,

[REDACTED]

to include but not limited to then-candidate Trump, by media outlets in many other nations, including NATO allies.<sup>xiii</sup> My professional judgement in 2016 was that multiple nations were seeking to shape the views of the US electorate, and that analytic objectivity demanded the IC pick one of two approaches. Either, the IC must note the presence of an online competition for US hearts and minds, in which Moscow might or might not be the most-active-player, or, establish a threshold for “normal” foreign media influence efforts directed at US voters which would be excluded from the IC’s high-priority threat analysis<sup>xiv</sup> (in other words, establish a “squelch” function, a tradecraft approach the NIC later employed for analysis of the 2018 Congressional elections, which I also participated in.) Applied to the 2017 ICA, this suggested either acknowledging the presence of media content that had denigrated (to varying degree) *both* leading US Presidential candidates, including denigrations within media based in allies like the United Kingdom, or, reach an IC judgment that some Russian media denigration of then-candidate Clinton fell within de-facto international norms. [REDACTED] chose to disregard these tradecraft suggestions and never directed us, despite my recommendation, to conduct quantitative semantic analysis of foreign media to identify trends,<sup>xv</sup> seeming to treat the 2017 ICA’s simplistic treatment of “Russia Today” as analytically sufficient. Therefore, I expressed substantial concern regarding the legitimacy of some of the analytic tradecraft being used to craft the 2017 ICA.

3. (U// [REDACTED]) **Issue 3. Message from National Intelligence Council (NIC) staff that “Steel Dossier” material “was a factor in” the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) of the 2016 Presidential Election.** On 18 September 2019, as a member of the NIC’s classified ELECTION\_INFLUENCE email distro, I received an email from [REDACTED], NIC Analytic Program Manager, directing a search in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request DF-2019-00269, and stating that “Shelby” - presumably [REDACTED], formerly the National Intelligence Manager (NIM) for Russia, Europe, and Eurasia, also the former “National Intelligence Crisis Manager for Elections” - had stated: “the dossier was a factor in the 2017 ICA on the election interference in which an assessment of the document was added as an annex” (see Attachment 2.)

- a. (U// [REDACTED]) The assertion that “Steel Dossier” material had been used in the 2017 ICA, was in contradiction to what [REDACTED] had previously implied, and at no time during the prior three years had any of the NIC staff members suggested to me that the IC viewed the “Steel Dossier” material as credible. I had been led to believe that the prior-DNI Clapper viewed the “Steel Dossier” material as untrustworthy, and I had believed it played no role in the 2017 ICA. Regarding the assertion that “*an assessment of the*

[REDACTED]

*document was added as an annex,” I knew neither the “Steele Dossier” nor any “assessment” of it had been present as an annex in the TS//SCI version of the 2017 ICA that I had seen. I thought this meant either the premise of the FOIA email was incorrect – or – that “Steele Dossier”-related material was held in CAP channels, which seemed like a potential inappropriate use of classification for something so widely available in the open source press. If the material had actually been a “factor,” or, even just attached to a compartmented ICA, and whether the 2017 ICA’s judgements were valid, or not, it seemed that [REDACTED] (and other NIO) had been actively misleading me, and potentially other NIC deputies, for several years.*

**4. (U/[REDACTED]) Issue 4: National Intelligence Council leadership dismissal of concerns.**

National Intelligence Council leadership dismissed my concerns regarding potential deliberate deception of Intelligence Officers by a NIO and of possible attempts to bias analysis. Following receipt of the FOIA email, I reached out to [REDACTED], the Vice Chair (VC) of the NIC, noting I had potentially responsive documents, had been present during the period in question, and expressed my concern at the possibility that I had been misled if the “Steel Dossier” material had been used.

- a. (U/[REDACTED]) The NIC VC responded by writing “...obviously, this all predates me. ... it is routine that we get material and don’t share it with everyone—and it’s not a matter of a particular clearance.” [Attachment 2] I later spoke briefly to the NIC VC in person and reiterated my concern. Both in email and in person, he was dismissive and displayed no alarm that a DNIO might have been intentionally misled by his supervisor, or that there might have been attempts undermine tradecraft or to bias NIC analysis.
- b. (U) Within days, I was taken off the NIC ELECTIONS distro without notice or explanation. I never saw what response was provided in response to FOIA Search DF-2019-00269. A subsequent performance appraisal by [REDACTED] misrepresented, I felt, my prior performance. From open source reporting, I judged that other violations of IC analytic integrity almost certainly occurred, that violations of law might have occurred, and that I likely had information relevant to ongoing criminal investigations.

**5. (U) Issue 5. Communications and recorded discussions with the IC IG. My engagement with the IC Inspector General (IG) which began in 2019 and continued through 2022, culminated in an IG representative’s assertion to me that the IG lacked any mechanism or process to convey whistleblower information of potential relevance to ongoing criminal investigations to a DOJ Special Council.**

- a. (U/[REDACTED]) On Monday, October 28, 2019, I reached out to a member of the IC IG team, relaying many of my concerns and the associated history, seeking guidance on how to proceed. I believed that the information I was in possession of might be of relevance to

[REDACTED]

investigations by Special Counsel Durham, and might have bearing on investigations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) processes. I was directed to contact the IC IG group address in a capacity as a potential Whistleblower, which I did on 29 October 2019.<sup>xvi</sup> For several months I persisted in seeking a meeting with the IC IG representatives, making clear that information I had might be relevant to ongoing criminal investigations,<sup>xvii xviii</sup> and my belief that the DNI should be made aware of these issues. An initial IC IG “intake” meeting was scheduled for 16 March 2020, then cancelled and delayed due to COVID-19 until 24 July 2020. In July 2020, I met IC IG staff in person at IC IG Headquarters. At this meeting, IC IG staff took extensive notes and made audio recordings. I expressed my view that information I had might be relevant to ongoing criminal investigations, and asked that the data, or at least the fact-of my concerns, be conveyed to the DNI and potentially to Special Counsel Durham. In October of 2021, after no substantive follow-up, I learned that a new IC IG, Thomas Monheim, had been appointed, and I emailed him directly on 7 October 2021. He replied on 15 October 2021, stating that he would follow up with his team.<sup>xix</sup> On 11 March 2022, I was contacted by the IC IG’s [REDACTED] who asked that I come back to IC IG Headquarters on 21 March 2022. At that meeting IC IG staff present included Deputy IC IG, [REDACTED] [no relation to [REDACTED], I was told.] Another extensive interview was conducted, during which I raised additional concerns that had developed since the initial intake interview, or that in retrospect I realized might be potentially significant. These included but were not limited to statements to me by [REDACTED] in 2016 and 2017, directing me to conceal from National Security Council officials the alleged<sup>xx</sup> [REDACTED] interception of electronic communications from members of the incoming Presidential administration.

- b. (U) At that 2022 meeting, the IC IG staff stated to me –for the first time - that the IC IG lacked a mechanism or authority to convey potentially relevant whistleblower information, regarding potential criminal activity, to the Department of Justice (DOJ) Special Counsel. IC IG staff acknowledged the possibility that I had witnessed malfeasance and events of possible relevance to ongoing criminal investigations being conducted by Special Counsel Durham, but the IC IG staff stated no procedure existed to pass information to DOJ investigators, save my taking action in personal capacity. The IC IG staff made clear they could not ask me to do so, and were not asking me to do so, but stated that I “could” If I chose to do so. I then asked if they shared my judgement that the “fact-of” my knowledge and concern – absent specific details - was unclassified, and they agreed it was. This was the last contact I have had with, or from, the IC IG.

**6. (U) Issue 6. Self-initiated engagement with a representative of Special Counsel Durham during 2022, with no substantive follow-up.** I sought to contact Special Counsel Durham with this information, as advised as my only option by the IC IG representatives, and did reach a person who claimed to work for the Special Counsel. After initial phone discussion and email conveyance of some information to that representative, there has been no follow-up or other further engagement with me for a statement or for any of my additional records or information.

[REDACTED]

- a. (U) On 28 March 2022, I signed and sent, by US Priority Mail, a letter to Special Counsel Durham [Attachment 5] at the 950 Pennsylvania Avenue address listed for the Special Counsel on the DOJ Website.
  
- b. (U) After days went by without any indication that my letter had been received, and given the potentially criminal nature of some events which concerned me, and, the occurrence of some of these events within the Commonwealth of Virginia, I contacted the office of Virginia Attorney General AG Miyares on 18 April 2022, via US Priority Mail. [Attachment 6] Shortly thereafter, I received a call from staff within the office of Virginia AG Miyares. They had received my letter, and stated they would convey it to persons within the Office of the Special Counsel. In April of 2022, I received a phone call from [REDACTED], ostensibly supporting Special Counsel Durham. We spoke by phone to the extent that was possible at the unclassified level. On 3 May 2022, via [REDACTED] (TS//SCI classified network) I sent [REDACTED] a series of ten emails, describing the situation and information I had, as well as additional concerns I held. The following day I sent several more emails. [REDACTED] replied to the effect that the Special Counsel was busy with upcoming trials, but that they would get back to me. Following conclusion of that trial, no contact from [REDACTED] or anyone in DOJ was forthcoming. I was never asked to interview, or to attest to any of the events, or for a more detailed description of my concerns. On 29 September 2022, I emailed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to note my concern that the ODNI classified email systems and networks were “losing” many of my files and email messages, in the hope that some preservation order or process might be initiated. Since September 2022, I have received no communication from [REDACTED] or any person associated with the Special Counsel. At present, I do not know if Special Counsel Durham has ever been made aware of my concerns or data, and my records on ODNI systems continue to intermittently degrade.

[REDACTED]

Endnotes

<sup>i</sup> (U) Email From: [redacted] Subject: [redacted] - Background on [redacted]; document is UNCLASSIFIED

<sup>ii</sup> (U) Email from: [redacted]  
Subject: (U) Bump into GAO, comment re hill by Squire Patten Boggs; document is UNCLASSIFIED//

<sup>iii</sup> (U) See Email From: [redacted] Subject: [AIN]  
[redacted] - Thank you and documents we promised - ; document is UNCLASSIFIED

<sup>iv</sup> See [redacted] (U// ) [redacted]; documents are both classified

<sup>v</sup> (U) See [redacted]

<sup>vi</sup> (S//NF) Email from [redacted]  
Subject: RE: [redacted] Cyberthreat to the 2016 Presidential Election - drafting - comments requested by 1100 AM Friday; document is classified

<sup>vii</sup> Email from [redacted]  
[redacted] subject: RE: [redacted] RE: IC SR Comments on your PDB on Cyber Activity  
Against US Election (2016-22827-IC)--on deck for Friday; document is classified

<sup>viii</sup> Email From: [redacted]  
[redacted] Subject: RE: (U) US Election machines - hacked??? ; document is classified

<sup>ix</sup> (U) See Email and Attachments, From: [redacted]  
[redacted] Subject: TPs for 2 December DC on Sensitive Topic;

documents are classified up to [redacted]  
<sup>x</sup> (U) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL A. SUSSMAN, Criminal Case No. 21-582 (CRC), filed 2/11/2022.

<sup>xi</sup> (U) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL A. SUSSMAN, Criminal Case No. 21-cr- VIOLATIONS: 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2), filed 9/16/2021.

<sup>xii</sup> Email from [redacted]  
[redacted] Subject: RE: [redacted] RE: IC SR Comments on your PDB on Cyber Activity  
Against US Election (2016-22827-IC)--on deck for Friday; document is classified

<sup>xiii</sup> (U) Email From: [redacted] Subject: (U) Why RT cheerleading is consistent with - but NOT, in and of itself - an act of disruption...; document is UNCLASSIFIED

<sup>xiv</sup> (U// ) On 4 January 2017, during review of IC analytic products on election interference, I raised the possibility, based on an analysis of the global media environment, that some NATO partners might have been using their media to seek to shape the outcome of the 2016 US Election.

<sup>xv</sup> (U) Email From: [redacted] Subject: (U) RE:/But..... RT cheerleading;  
document is classified

<sup>xvi</sup> (U) Email From: [redacted] Subject: (U) RE - SENSITIVE; document is classified

<sup>xvii</sup> (U) Email From: [redacted] Subject: RE: (U) RE - SENSITIVE; document is classified

<sup>xviii</sup> (U) Email From: [redacted] Subject: FW: ACTION  
REQUIRED: FOIA Search DF-2019-00269 (Hermann) ; document is classified

<sup>xix</sup> (U) Email From: [redacted] Subject: RE: (U) FW: ICIG / AG Durham / Russia / potential  
Irregularities in analytic practice (UNCLASSIFIED// ) document is UNCLASSIFIED// [redacted]

[REDACTED]

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\*\* (U) For context see Email From: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Subject: (U) Initial back brief on TDY to Cambridge MA this week; document is classified

[REDACTED]